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Abstract 
This paper investigates how working from home affects employees’ work effort. Employees, 
who have the possibility to work from home, have a high autonomy in scheduling their work and 
therefore are assumed to have a higher intrinsic motivation. Thus, we expect working from home 
to positively influence work effort of employees. For the empirical analysis we use the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). To account for self-selection into working locations we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy. Our empirical results show that working from 
home has a significantly positive influence on work effort. Moreover, we find that also the 
frequency of working from home is crucial. The more often employees work from home, the 
higher is the work effort they provide. 
 
JEL Classification: J81; M50; M54 
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1 Introduction 
The prevalence of working from home arrangements in firms has increased over the past decades 
due to advancements in information and communication technologies (Shamir and Salomon 1985; 
Baruch 2000). In the year 2009, more than twenty percent of German firms provide their 
employees the possibility to work at least a couple of days per month from home (Flüter-
Hoffmann 2012). 1  This possibility to work from home increases employees’ autonomy in 
scheduling and organizing their work. Employees with higher autonomy have a stronger intrinsic 
motivation and are therefore willing to provide more work effort (Hackman and Oldham 1976; 
Bailey and Kurland 2002). Moreover, by offering agreeable working conditions, firms can attract 
and retain highly skilled and hard-working employees (DuBrin 1991). 
However, empirical evidence on how working from home arrangements influence employees’ 
work effort is scarce. Some studies analyze the relationship between working from home and 
employees’ productivity using survey data (Bailyn 1988; Olson 1989; DuBrin 1991; Bélanger 
1999). All four studies find a positive effect on employees’ productivity. Yet, they use subjective 
indicators (Bailyn 1988; Olson 1989; Bélanger 1999), which measure the employees’ perceived 
productivity change, or they use small data sets, which include only one firm in a specific industry 
(DuBrin 1991). Other studies investigate the influence of working from home on employees’ 
productivity with data from laboratory or field experiments in order to estimate causal effects 
(Dutcher 2012; Bloom, Liang, Roberts and Ying 2015). Both studies find a significant positive 
effect of working from home on employees’ productivity. Though, experimental results apply to a 
small subgroup of individuals and are not fully transferable to the whole population of employees. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we investigate the effect of working from home 
on employees’ work effort with a large, individual-level dataset from Germany, the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). By providing an empirical investigation across all industries and 
occupations, we obtain a comprehensive analysis of working from home arrangements with high 
external validity. Second, we account for the working from home frequency. Some studies 
mention that it is important to consider how often employees work from home (e.g. Oettinger 
2011; Bailey and Kurland 2002), but do not include this measure in their empirical analysis. An 
exception is the study by Gariety and Shaffer (2007), who analyze the impact of working from 
                                                          
1 For an overview of the working from home development in Germany for the years 1997 to 2009 see figure 1. 
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home on wages, and also include frequency measures into their empirical analysis. Therefore, we 
investigate the influence of working from home on work effort and also analyze the working from 
home frequency. 
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of working from home on employees’ work effort is 
ambiguous. As firms have fewer possibilities to monitor their employees, working from home 
might induces shirking and hence results in lower individual work effort (Gariety and Shaffer 
2007). However, the possibility to work from home increases employees’ autonomy and thus their 
intrinsic motivation (Hackman and Oldham 1976; Bailey and Kurland 2002). Therefore, 
employees, who work from home, might have a higher commitment and thus respond with “extra” 
work effort. Consequently, the degree of autonomy is also important. The more frequent 
employees stay at home, the larger has to be the effect of working from home on work effort. 
For the empirical analysis we use the SOEP, which covers more than 22.000 individuals living in 
12.000 households. To measure work effort, we calculate the difference between average actual 
working time and contractual working time following Beckmann, Cornelissen and Kräkel (2015). 
Our main explanatory variable indicates if an employee works from home or not. Moreover, we 
consider the degree of employees’ autonomy by distinguishing four categories of the working 
from home frequency (i.e. “daily”, “often”, “sometimes” and “rarely”). 
Empirical studies, which analyze the characteristics of employees, who work from home, find that 
employees, who work from home, and those, who always stay in the office, systematically 
differentiate (e.g. Noonan and Glass 2012). The SOEP provides the possibility to control for 
observable individual, job and firm specific heterogeneity, for instance socio-economic 
background or working conditions. Though, unobserved characteristics can also cause self-
selection into the working location. In order to reduce endogeneity biases, we additionally use a 
two-stage least squares estimation approach. 
Our empirical results show that working from home increases employees’ work effort. Using 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy we get similar results. Working from home has a 
significant positive impact on work effort of employees. Additionally, we find evidence that also 
the frequency of working from home matters. Employees, who stay at home more often, provide a 
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higher work effort than those employees, who stay at home very rarely or work in the office. Thus, 
employees can benefit from a higher degree of autonomy, if they work from home more often. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the related literature on working from 
home. Theoretical arguments, how working from home influences work effort, are discussed in 
section 3. In section 4, we give an overview of the used dataset and describe our first descriptive 
results. In section 5 follows an explanation of the estimation strategy. We discuss our empirical 
results in section 6. In this section we also present two robustness checks to give evidence that the 
higher work effort of employees is driven by intrinsic motivation. The paper concludes with a 
discussion in section 7. 
 
2 Related Literature 
Over the last three decades, researchers analyze working from home and its consequences in 
various disciplines like business and economics, environmental sciences or psychology (e.g. 
Bailyn 1988; Henderson, Koenig and Mokhtarian 1996; Gajendran and Harrison 2007). According 
to the literature, working from home is characterized by two main aspects. First, employees work 
outside the common workplace. Second, a connection between home and office exists. 
Information exchange and communication with colleagues is possible through the use of 
information and communication technologies (Bélanger 1999; Bailey and Kurland 2002). 
Moreover, the literature states that employees need to have a suitable job design for working from 
home. Working from home is most suitable for employees, who mainly have knowledge-based 
tasks, few face-to-face contacts and a high degree of autonomy (Bailey and Kurland 2002). 
A majority of the studies focus on analyzing benefits and drawbacks of working from home (e.g. 
Baruch 2000; Gajendran and Harrison 2007) or analyze the influence of working from home on 
work-family balance (e.g. Sullivan and Lewis 2001; Hill, Ferris and Märtinson 2003; Golden, 
Veiga and Simsek 2006). In contrast, performance effects of working from home receive little 
attention in the literature. 
Older studies, which investigate the relationship of working from home and employees’ 
performance, primarily use case studies and survey data from specific industries (Bailyn 1988; 
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Olson 1989; DuBrin 1991; Bélanger 1999). Bailyn (1988) gives first insights into working from 
home and influences on employees using data from three case studies. All interviewed employees 
indicate that their perceived productivity increases while working from home. This positive impact 
on productivity is mainly attributed to a higher degree of autonomy and thus increased motivation. 
A quite similar study to Bailyn (1988) is the study by Olson (1989), who analyzes the 
consequences of working from home for employees and their employers, with data from three case 
studies. She finds that employees report a slight increase in perceived productivity. Though, 
employers state that they do not realize any productivity gains. Olson (1989) explains the merely 
moderate productivity increase at home in the three considered cases by bad technological 
equipment, which employees face at home. Another study that analyzes the impact of working 
from home on productivity is the study by DuBrin (1991). He uses data on clerical employees 
working in a large US market research firm, who can either work from home or stay in the office. 
Productivity is measured as data entries per hour for a project group. DuBrin (1991) shows in his 
empirical analysis that working from home increases group productivity. However, he compares 
changes in group productivity when projects are moved from office to working from home. 
Though, there is no comparison of productivity changes for the same employees. Bélanger (1999) 
investigates how working from home affects the perceived productivity of employees in the high 
technology sector. She finds that working from home is associated with higher perceived 
productivity. However, results need to be interpreted with caution as Bélanger (1999) also finds 
that employees self-select into working from home and therefore differentiate in their 
characteristics. 
To address the self-selection problem of working from home and estimate causal effects, newer 
studies use experimental data (Dutcher 2012; Bloom et al. 2015). Dutcher (2012) investigates how 
working from home influences individual productivity by conducting a real-task laboratory 
experiment at a US university. He also considers the nature of the job task by distinguishing 
between creative and boring tasks. Dutcher (2012) finds that working from home increases 
productivity of individuals when doing creative tasks. Though, he finds that working from home 
has a negative influence on productivity if the task is too boring. Bloom et al. (2015) conduct a 
field experiment in a large Chinese travel agency to analyze the effect of working from home on 
employees’ performance. Call center agents are randomly assigned to the two working locations; 
home and office. They measure overall performance as number of phone calls and length of phone 
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calls. Bloom et al. (2015) find that working from home increases overall performance of 
employees. They explain their finding by higher productivity associated with a quieter working 
atmosphere and also by higher work effort as employees tend to have fewer breaks. However, the 
results of both experimental studies apply to subgroups. Thus, a transfer to the whole working 
population is difficult. 
We contribute to the literature by providing a more detailed analysis of working from home 
considering a huge number of different occupations and all industries and therefore conduct an 
empirical analysis with high external validity. Moreover, we use an indicator for work effort, 
which is still self-reported, but more objective than measures that rely on self-reported, perceived 
changes in individual productivity. To address endogeneity of the decision to work from home, we 
additionally provide an IV estimation. 
 
3 Theoretical Background 
Working from home has a twofold influence on employees. First, working from home offers 
employees a higher degree of autonomy than working in the office (Shamir and Salomon 1985). 
Referring to the job characteristics model by Hackman and Oldham (1976), job design especially 
the enrichment of jobs influences employees’ motivation and working behavior. Hackman and 
Oldham (1976) argue that specific job characteristics including a high degree of autonomy have a 
positive impact on employees’ motivation and performance. Hence, working from home should 
positively affect intrinsic motivation. As employers have fewer possibilities to monitor their 
employees at home, the offer of working from home is in addition an expression of appreciation 
and trust. According to Fehr and Gächter (2000), employees respond to benefits like the supply of 
working from home with reciprocal behavior in terms of “extra” work effort. 
Second, working from home affects employees’ working conditions. Working from home provides 
a more flexible scheduling of working time than working in the office. Employees can work at 
their most productive working hours, even at the night. In contrast, when staying in the office 
employees need to conform to general office hours and common breaks even though it is not their 
preferred scheduling of working time (Bailyn 1988). Moreover, at home employees are less often 
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distracted by colleagues and work in a quieter general working atmosphere, leading to reduced 
work-related stress (Bélanger 1999; Bloom et al. 2015). 
Therefore, we assume that highly intrinsically motivated and more relaxed employees provide 
more work effort than their counterparts, who always stay in the office. Thus, we formulate our 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Working from home increases employees’ work effort. 
The second purpose of our study is to analyze how the working from home frequency, i.e. how 
many days per month employees stay at home, influences work effort. Bailey and Kurland (2002) 
argue that advantages of working from home, in particular the increased autonomy are more 
pronounced the more frequent employees stay at home. Thus, we expect employees, who work 
from home very often, to provide higher work effort than employees, who only stay infrequent at 
home or always stay in the office. Hence, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: The more frequent employees work from home, the higher is their work effort. 
 
4 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we present the used dataset and give some descriptive statistics. Section 4.1 
introduces the German Socio-Economic Panel and in section 4.2 we describe all included 
variables. In section 4.3, we analyze the characteristics of employees, who work from home, and 
compare them with characteristics of employees, who always stay in the office. 
 
4.1 German Socio-Economic Panel 
For our empirical analysis we draw on the SOEP, which is conducted yearly since 1984 by the 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). The SOEP is an internationally well-known 
individual-level dataset that covers more than 22.000 individuals, who live in more than 12.000 
households (Wagner, Frick and Schupp 2007). As the SOEP is a large, representative dataset, 
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which includes individuals having different jobs and work in all German industries, we can 
provide a detailed analysis of working from home in Germany.2 
This dataset perfectly fits our research question as it provides information on working locations 
and includes variables that indicate employees’ work effort. Moreover, the SOEP contains 
information on individuals’ socio-economic background and job characteristics. For our analysis 
we use data from the year 2009 and add information from the years 2002 and 2006. We include all 
employees working in the private and public sector aged between 17 and 65 years. Though, we 
exclude self-employed from our analysis as these persons have very irregular working hours, 
conditional on demand. Moreover, we exclude civil servants and apprentices, because their 
working hours are often regulated by law and they cannot freely decide how long they want to 
work in a week. To be included in the analysis, employees need to have a minimum wage of 400 
euros. Our final sample contains 5311 observations. 
 
4.2 Included Variables 
We introduce two measures for working from home as explanatory variables. First, we include a 
binary variable, which takes the value 1 if an employee works from home and 0 otherwise. 
Second, we distinguish between four different forms of working from home to analyze the 
influence of the working from home frequency. The first category is “daily” working from home. 
Individuals in this category always work from home. The whole communication with colleagues 
and clients is through information and communication technologies (Bailey and Kurland 2002). 
Employees, who work a couple of days per week from home, but stay at least one day per week in 
the office, are categorized as “often” working from home. To work from home “sometimes” is 
defined as working from home one to two times in a month. The fourth category includes 
employees, who work very infrequently from home. This category is called “rarely” working from 
home. Our reference category denotes employees, who “never” work from home.  
As dependent variable we use employees’ work effort. Employees, who experience generous 
working conditions, for instance a high degree of autonomy when having the possibility to work 
from home, tend to reciprocal respond to these generous working conditions by providing “extra” 
                                                          
2 For further information on the SOEP see Wagner et al. (2007). 
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work effort (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Therefore, we measure work effort as average actual 
working hours minus contractual working hours per week following Beckmann et al. (2015). A 
positive difference implies an intrinsic motivated “extra” work effort employees provide for their 
employer as the additional working time is not part of the work contract (Beckmann et al. 2015). 
The SOEP provides a lot of information on the socio-economic background of individuals. We 
control for gender, age and nationality. As preferences for the working location depend on the 
family situation and induced responsibilities (Bélanger 1999), we include variables, which display 
individuals’ housing situation. We account for living together with a partner and whether an 
employee has young children under the age of sixteen in his household. Additionally, we consider 
caring responsibilities for older or diseased family members. To capture personality traits we 
include a variable that measures the self-reported risk tolerance of employees. The financial 
situation is considered by employees’ years of schooling that are interrelated to job position. 
Moreover, we control for the region in which individuals live.3 
We also account for various job characteristics in our empirical analysis like individual experience 
or tenure and include whether an employee works part-time or under a fixed-term work contract. 
In addition, we have detailed information on specific job positions. We include nine dummy 
variables for occupation, which display different educational levels and task competencies. 
Moreover, we consider if someone has a leadership position. As employees’ work effort depends 
on working conditions, we take job satisfaction and payment structure into consideration. The self-
reported value for job satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10. To account for the payment structure, we 
insert two variables. First, we include monthly gross wage. Second, we include a binary variable 
that takes the value 1 if someone receives a performance-based pay as in the literature there is 
large empirical evidence that performance pay induces higher performance (e.g. Lazear 2000b; 
Cadsby, Song and Tapon 2007). To compute the performance-based pay dummy variable, we use 
information whether performance evaluations influence wages or bonuses. An important reason 
for the decision to work from home, which is often discussed in the working from home literature, 
is commuting distance (e.g. Baruch 2000). Therefore, we also account for the distance between 
firm and employees’ home. Moreover, the SOEP even provides information on some firm 
                                                          
3 We distinguish between the sixteen German federal states. 
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characteristics. We include four categories to capture firm size and insert ten dummy variables for 
industry. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all included variables. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.3 Characteristics of Employees, who Work from Home 
In the literature there is no common view how typical employees, who work from home, are 
characterized. In empirical studies, findings on characteristics of employees, who work from 
home, depend on the definition of working from home and on the used data base (Bailey and 
Kurland 2002). However, all empirical studies find that employees who, work from home, and 
those employees, who stay in the office, systematically differentiate (e.g. DuBrin 1991; Bélanger 
1999; Noonan and Glass 2012). We also get this impression if we compare the average employee, 
who works from home (WFH), with the average employee, who works in the office (WIO), in our 
sample of German employees. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive results for the comparison of working from home with working in 
the office. We perform paired t-tests and report means and the corresponding p-values. We include 
employee characteristics that are often analyzed in empirical studies, like gender or family 
situation (e.g. Noonan and Glass 2012), and also include characteristics that theoretically influence 
the decision for the working location, like the commuting distance (Baruch 2000). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our descriptive results show that fewer women work from home than men. Forty-one percent of 
the employees, who decide to work from home, are women, whereas fifty-nine percent are men. 
For the employees, who work in the office, we find an equal gender distribution. This result is in 
contradiction to most of the empirical findings in the literature (e.g. DuBrin 1991; Bélanger 1999). 
Bélanger (1999) argues that working from home is mainly a preference for women. She explains 
her finding by the advantage of working from home to give women the chance to compare 
working and family lives. An explanation for our finding could be that in Germany employees 
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with different jobs work from home than for instance in the US. In comparison to Bélanger (1999), 
we find that a lot of employees with a leadership position decide to work from home. More than 
sixty percent of the employees, which work at least some days per month from home, have a 
leadership position. In contrast, only fifteen percent of the employees, who always stay in the 
office, have leading competencies. Thus, our descriptive results show that also highly productive 
employees with leadership positions work from home. Most of the employees, who fill in a 
leadership position, are men. Moreover, we find differences in the average years of schooling 
between employees, who decide to work from home, and those, who decide to stay in the office. 
Working from home goes together with longer education. This is in line with the argumentation 
that in Germany mainly well-educated employees with leadership positions use the possibility to 
work from home. 
Working from home is not as prevalent for part-time employees as for full-time employees. Only 
seventeen percent of the employees, who work from home, have a part-time work contract, 
whereas twenty-four percent of the employees, who work in the office, also work part-time. This 
distinction is highly statistically significant. Hence, that there are differences between working 
from home and working in the office in terms of part-time experience is not astonishing. 
Employees, who stay in the office, have on average longer experience in part-time work. 
As expected the family situation is crucial for the decision to work from home. Noonan and Glass 
(2012) argue that employees decide to work from home to take caring responsibilities. We find 
that employees, who decide to work from home, have more often a partner and also have more 
often young children under the age of sixteen in their households. Employees with caring 
responsibilities benefit most from the flexible scheduling of working time, which improves the 
work-family balance (Bailey and Kurland 2002). 
We only find slightly differences in the age of employees, who work from home, and those, who 
work in the office. Both groups are between forty-three and forty-four years old on average. 
Interestingly, we do not find differences of employees, who work from home, and those, who 
work in the office, in terms of experience in full-time work and tenure. One would expect that only 
employees with long tenure and experience get the permission to work from home. But our 
descriptive results show that this is not the case. Our results for age and tenure go in line with 
those what is mostly found in the literature (Bélanger 1999; Noonan and Glass 2012). 
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The most interesting results are for commuting distance and monthly gross wage. Our descriptive 
results show that employees, who work from home, live on average thirty-three kilometers away 
from their firms’ facilities. Employees, who stay the whole week in the office, have in comparison 
an average commuting distance of twenty kilometers. Thus, there is a selection of employees, who 
have a very long commuting way, into working from home to save time for productive tasks at 
home. This finding is also in line with the literature, as the saving of commuting time is an often 
mentioned advantage for working from home (Baruch 2000). The second interesting finding is that 
employees, who work from home, earn on average much more than employees, who stay in the 
office. This result is in line with the argumentation that employees with leading positions can 
decide to work a couple of days per month from home due to their higher bargaining power. 
Employees in top positions have high bargaining power and can better negotiate about preferable 
working conditions like the right to work from home (Bélanger 1999). Another explanation is that 
well-paid positions are often positions that have a lot of creative tasks. These employees can 
benefit more from a quieter working atmosphere at home than those employees with rather more 
simple tasks (Bailyn 1988). 
 
5 Estimation Strategy 
To analyze the impact of working from home on employees’ work effort, we estimate the 
following equation using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖         (1) 
Our dependent variable is work effort, which is measured as the difference between average actual 
working hours and contractual working hours for employee 𝑖𝑖. 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 captures the working location 
of an employee. 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if someone works from home and 
0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 indicates all considered control variables. We introduce control variables for the 
socio-economic background and controls for job characteristics of individuals. Thereby, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 
are the corresponding coefficients and 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖 denotes the error term. 
The impact of working from home on employees’ work effort depends on frequency, as benefits of 
working from home, in particular individual’s autonomy, are more pronounced the more often an 
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employee stays at home (Bailey and Kurland 2002). Therefore, we also analyze the influence of 
the working from home frequency on work effort with our second estimation equation: 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜁𝜁 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 + 𝑢𝑢2𝑖𝑖  (2) 
Here, we distinguish between four frequency levels, namely daily ( 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ), often 
(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖), sometimes (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) and rarely (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) as defined in section 4. The 
reference category is that an employee never works from home. 𝜁𝜁 , 𝜂𝜂 , 𝜃𝜃  and 𝜅𝜅  denote the 
corresponding coefficients and 𝑢𝑢2𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
In section 4, we show that the group of employees, who work from home, and those, who always 
stay in the office, systematically differentiate. We find for instance that employees, who have 
better education and higher earnings, more often decide to work from home. Employees’ with 
family responsibilities and a longer commuting distance also more often opt for working from 
home. A self-selection into the working location can also be caused by unobserved characteristics 
and thus lead to biased and inconsistent OLS estimation results. In order to get meaningful results 
that can be interpreted in a causal manner, we perform an IV estimation approach. The following 
equation is our first stage estimation equation: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖2009 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜈𝜈 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖2002 + 𝜉𝜉 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖2006 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖       (3) 
We include two instruments for the working from home decision. First, we use the working 
location in the year 2002 (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖2002), as we expect a high correlation with the actual decision for 
the workplace, but no direct effect on work effort seven years later.4 Second, we use employer-
provided computer or laptop, which employees can use for job-related or personal purpose at 
home (𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖2006). We also expect a high correlation with the decision to work from home. A 
computer is a fringe benefit and therefore part of the firms’ payment structure. As fringe benefits 
have a strong impact on employees’ morale and intrinsic motivation and thus on employees’ work 
effort (Kube, Maréchal and Puppe 2012), we use lagged information on employer-provided 
computer from the year 2006. Fringe benefits influence employees’ work effort in the same year, 
                                                          
4 The dataset provides information on employees’ working location in the waves 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2009. We 
decide to use the working location in the year 2002 as this information is closest to the year 2009. 
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but should not have a long lasting effect on motivation.5 Hence, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖2002 and 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖2006 are 
valid instruments for the decision to work from home. The corresponding coefficients are 𝜈𝜈 and 𝜉𝜉. 
We use the same set of control variables, denoted by 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term. For all equations 
we compute robust standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity (White 1980). Subsequently, we 
insert the predicted value for working from home in equation (1). 
 
6 Results 
This section provides our empirical results. In section 6.1, we discuss the influence of working 
from home on employees’ work effort. Section 6.2 addresses the question how the frequency of 
working from home affects employees’ work effort. In section 6.3, we provide additional 
robustness checks to analyze if higher work effort is driven by intrinsic motivation or has other 
explanations. 
 
6.1 Working from Home and Employees’ Work Effort 
We expect working from home to have a positive influence on work effort of employees as 
formulated in hypothesis 1. Table 3 shows the OLS estimation results. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Specification (1) displays the estimation results without including any control variables. In 
specifications (2) and (3), we include either control variables for socio-economic background or 
job characteristics. In specification (4), the full set of control variables are included. The R-
squared increases from 0.0723 to 0.2032, when we include all control variables indicating a better 
adjustment of the OLS estimation to the existing database. Thus, we refer to the estimation results 
in specification (4). Our empirical analysis shows that working from home is positively associated 
with employees’ work effort. The corresponding coefficient is 2.4287 and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Therefore, our first hypothesis is supported by the results. Considering the 
                                                          
5 In the dataset, we only have information on employer-provided computer or laptop in the waves 2006 and 2008. As 
the motivational impact of received fringe benefits in the year 2008 might influences employees’ work effort one year 
later, we use information on employer-provided computer from the year 2006. 
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estimation results in specifications (2) and (3), individuals’ job characteristics explain the largest 
part of the working from home effect on work effort. 
Our empirical analysis also indicates that women provide lower weekly work effort than men.6 
However, women have more often the responsibility to take care of children than men (Gajendran 
and Harrison 2007) and hence less time to provide “extra” work effort. This argumentation goes in 
line with the empirical result that having young children is also negatively associated with work 
effort. Tenure and age have a negative influence on work effort. An explanation can be that older 
employees, which are also those employees with the highest tenure, have a shorter remaining 
working time and hence lower career prospects (Davidson III, Xie, Xu and Ning 2007). Therefore, 
they do not need to show their ambition with “extra” work effort. Moreover, we find that having a 
leadership position is positively associated with work effort. Employees with leading 
competencies have more responsibility for tasks than the other employees. Though, they will work 
longer hours to finish time-critical tasks. A surprising result what we find is that job satisfaction 
influences work effort negatively. According to the job characteristics model (Hackman and 
Oldham 1976), one would expect that a higher job satisfaction leads to higher intrinsic motivation 
and therefore high job satisfaction should have a positive impact on work effort. However, the 
indicator for job satisfaction used here contains all aspects of the job, for instance wage or 
relationship to the boss or colleagues, and we do not know which aspect of the job drives the 
empirical result for job satisfaction. 
In order to consider self-selection into the working location and hence to reach causal results, we 
perform an IV estimation. Table 4 presents the IV estimation results.7 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
As instruments for working from home we use the working location seven years ago and whether 
an employee receives an employer-provided computer or laptop three years ago. Specification (1) 
displays the IV estimation results if we include WFH_2002 as instrument for working from home. 
In specification (2), we include both instruments (WFH_2002, Computer_2006). Our first stage 
estimation results show that both instruments have a positive and highly statistically significant 
influence on the decision to work from home in the year 2009, thus we refer to the IV estimation 
                                                          
6 Empirical results for all control variables are displayed in table A1 in the appendix. 
7 For completeness, table A2 in the appendix notifies the IV estimation results for all control variables. 
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results in specification (2). The value of the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 93.4304. As this value 
exceeds the critical point of 10 considering the “rule of thumbs” established by Staiger and Stock 
(1997), we can conclude that both instruments are relevant. The second aspect for instruments to 
be valid is that they have to be exogenous. Thus, we test the overidentification restriction. The p-
value of the Hansen J statistic is 0.2111 und hence substantial larger than the critical value of 0.1. 
The second stage estimation result indicates that the coefficient for working from home increases 
to 4.9400 compared to the OLS estimation result (2.4287) and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Therefore, our first hypothesis that working from home has a positive effect on employees’ 
work effort is also supported by the IV estimation. Employees, who can work from home, provide 
nearly five hours more work effort per week than employees, who always stay in the office. 
 
6.2 Working from Home Frequency and Employees’ Work Effort 
Table 5 displays the OLS estimation results for the empirical analysis how the working from home 
frequency affects work effort.8 We expect that employees, who stay at home more often, to have a 
higher work effort than employees, who stay at home rarely or always stay in the office. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Specification (1) reports the OLS estimation results without including any control variables. 
Control variables for socio-economic background or job characteristics are included in 
specification (2) and (3), respectively. In specification (4), we consider all control variables for 
socio-economic background and job characteristics, thus we refer to the estimation results in 
specification (4). All four coefficients have the expected signs. The four forms of working from 
home are positively associated with work effort of employees. However, we can identify striking 
differences between the distinct degrees of the working from home frequency. The corresponding 
coefficients for WFH_Daily, WFH_Often, WFH_Sometimes and WFH_Rarely are 5.6845, 
3.1659, 2.1369 and 1.3584, respectively (statistically significant at the 1% level). As expected, the 
more often employees work from home the higher is the work effort they provide, supporting our 
second hypothesis. 
                                                          
8 Table A3 in the Appendix displays the OLS estimation results for all control variables. 
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6.3 Robustness Checks 
A possible risk of working from home, which is often proclaimed in the literature, is that it induces 
shirking (e.g. Gariety and Shaffer 2007; Noonan and Glass 2012). However, we argue that 
working from home increases autonomy and hence intrinsic motivation. Therefore, working from 
home incentivizes employees to provide “extra” work effort. 
To provide evidence that employees provide intrinsic motivated higher work effort, we separate 
our sample in two subgroups. We distinguish between employees, who receive performance pay, 
and those employees, who receive a fixed wage. Employees, who receive performance pay, have a 
payment structure that is output-oriented. Thus, these employees have no incentive for shirking 
(Lazear 2000a). If working from home induces shirking, it should only influence work effort of 
employees, who get a fixed wage. 
Table 6 shows the empirical results for the analysis how working from home influences work 
effort, separated for the two payment schemes.9 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Specification (1) displays the results for employees with performance pay and specification (2) 
displays the results for employees with a fixed wage. The corresponding coefficients for 
employees, who receive performance pay and work from home, and for employees, who receive a 
fixed wage and work from home, are 2.3907 and 2.5380, respectively (statistically significant at 
the 1% level). Both results show that working from home has a quite similar influence on 
employees with different payment schemes. Employees, who receive a fixed wage, even provide 
slightly more work effort. The empirical results support our theoretical explanation that employees 
perceive working from home as a fringe benefit, which offers more autonomy, and hence they 
respond with higher work effort. 
Our empirical results in section 6.1 show that employees, who have the possibility to work from 
home, provide substantial higher work effort. However, using this indicator for work effort we 
cannot analyze the reasons why employees are willing to provide more working hours in a week. 
Is “extra” work effort really induced by higher intrinsic motivation as we expect in our theoretical 
                                                          
9 Table A4 in the appendix notifies estimation results including regression coefficients for all control variables. 
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argumentation? Another explanation for longer working hours at home might be that employees 
have an extrinsic incentive, i.e. additional pay. Therefore, in a next step we analyze the impact of 
working from home on weekly overtime hours and distinguish between paid and unpaid overtime. 
Table 7 displays the OLS estimation results for the influence of working from home on overtime 
hours.10 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Specification (1) displays the impact of working from home on weekly paid overtime hours and 
specification (2) on weekly unpaid overtime hours, respectively. Our empirical analysis indicates 
that working from home is compared to working in the office negatively associated with paid 
overtime hours. The size of the regression coefficient is -0.1959 (statistically significant at the 
10% level). In contrast, working from home is positively associated with weekly unpaid overtime 
hours. The corresponding regression coefficient is 1.3185 (statistically significant at the 1% 
level).Thus, we can conclude that working from home indeed induces intrinsic motivation. 
Furthermore, our empirical findings show, if employees receive extrinsic motivation, i.e. 
additional payment, employees, who work from home, provide even less paid overtime hours per 
week than their counterparts, who always stay in the office. 
 
7 Discussion 
This study investigates how working from home influences employees’ work effort. According to 
Gajendran and Harrison (2007) only a minority of employees always work from home, the 
majority spend just a few days per month at home. Therefore, it is also important for employers to 
know how employees’ work effort is affected by frequency. Thus, we additionally consider the 
working from home frequency in our empirical analysis. 
However, a lot of employers fear that employees exploit the freedom when working from home 
and lower their individual work effort (Gariety and Shaffer 2007). In contrast, considering 
theoretical models from behavioral economics, for instance the job characteristics model by 
                                                          
10 For completeness, we report estimation results for all control variables in table A5. 
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Hackman and Oldham (1976), increased autonomy in organizing work boosts intrinsic motivation 
and hence induces higher work effort (Hackman and Oldham 1976). 
Our empirical analysis shows that working from home has a statistically significant positive effect 
on work effort. As the decision to work from home is endogenous, we also conduct an IV 
estimation to account for a self-selection into the working location. Empirical results also hold in 
the IV estimation. Furthermore, we find that employees, who work from home more frequently, 
provide higher work effort than employees, who only stay very infrequently at home or always 
stay in the office. 
Additional empirical analyses show that increased work effort is intrinsically motivated “extra” 
work effort as we find that working from home also has a positive impact on unpaid overtime 
hours and is even negatively associated with paid overtime. The last question that remains is if this 
“extra” work effort is productive. Bloom et al. (2015) indicate in their study with experimental 
data that employees, who can work from home, have an increased work effort. This result is in line 
with our empirical findings. Moreover, they find that employees, who work from home, are also 
more productive. Thus, implementing working from home seems to be a beneficial strategy for 
firms. 
In addition to inducing higher work effort, employers can benefit from the implementation of 
working from home, as they can save operating costs due to reduced office space (Bloom et al. 
2015). Though, they should be aware of challenges and potential problems. First, working from 
home should be an option. As employees have different preferences, mandatory working from 
home could induce dissatisfaction (Bélanger 1999). Additionally, working from home is 
experienced by employees as a benefit and a symbol of appreciation and trust if it is voluntary. 
Only under this condition, employees respond to working from home with “extra” work effort 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000). Second, a potential drawback of working from home is that it can cause 
personal and professional isolation, because employees have reduced social interaction (Hill et al. 
2003). Therefore, firms need to adjust their organizational culture to working from home. 
Employees need to have regular face-to-face team meetings with supervisors and colleagues to 
share important information, to feel integrated in the team and to identify with the company 
(Bailyn 1988). Third, employees have the highest intrinsic motivation if they are not only 
19 
 
responsible for their work but also get regular feedback on their performance (Hackman and 
Oldham 1976). Thus, firms need to make sure that they provide appropriate feedback. 
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Figures 
      Figure 1. Development of Working from Home (WFH) in Germany (1997-2009)        
 
Source: SOEP (waves 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2009), own calculations. 
Note: Apprentices, civil servants and self-employed individuals are excluded. 
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Tables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
Work Effort 5311 3.851 5.534 -17.000 40.000
Explanatory Variables
WFH 5311 0.148 0.355 0 1
WFH Frequency
WFH_Daily 5311 0.018 0.131 0 1
WFH_Often 5311 0.031 0.172 0 1
WFH_Sometimes 5311 0.032 0.177 0 1
WFH_Rarely 5311 0.068 0.251 0 1
WFH_Never 5311 0.852 0.355 0 1
Socio-Economic Background
Female 5311 0.489 0.500 0 1
Age 5311 43.831 10.112 19 65
Partner 5311 0.847 0.360 0 1
Foreign 5311 0.054 0.225 0 1
Years of Schooling 5311 12.581 2.554 7 18
Children under 16 Years 5311 0.329 0.470 0 1
Caring Responsibilities 5311 0.014 0.118 0 1
Risk Tolerance 5311 3.962 2.088 0 10
Region
Baden-Württemberg 5311 0.128 0.334 0 1
Bavaria 5311 0.147 0.354 0 1
Berlin 5311 0.034 0.180 0 1
Brandenburg 5311 0.039 0.194 0 1
Bremen 5311 0.007 0.083 0 1
Hamburg 5311 0.013 0.112 0 1
Hesse 5311 0.071 0.256 0 1
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 5311 0.024 0.153 0 1
Lower Saxony 5311 0.089 0.284 0 1
North Rhine-Westphalia 5311 0.197 0.398 0 1
Rhineland-Palatinate 5311 0.044 0.206 0 1
Saarland 5311 0.012 0.108 0 1
Saxony 5311 0.081 0.272 0 1
Saxony-Anhalt 5311 0.044 0.205 0 1
Schleswig-Holstein 5311 0.026 0.158 0 1
Thuringia 5311 0.046 0.209 0 1
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
 
  
25 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work 5311 0.226 0.418 0 1
Fixed-term Work 5311 0.072 0.258 0 1
Occupational Position
Untrained Worker 5311 0.024 0.152 0 1
Semi-trained Worker 5311 0.099 0.299 0 1
Trained Worker 5311 0.142 0.349 0 1
Foreman 5311 0.025 0.155 0 1
Master Craftsman 5311 0.010 0.100 0 1
Industry Foreman 5311 0.006 0.075 0 1
Employee, Without Training 5311 0.027 0.164 0 1
Employee, With Training 5311 0.106 0.308 0 1
Employee, Qualified Duties 5311 0.304 0.474 0 1
Leadership Position 5311 0.221 0.415 0 1
Experience
Experience in Full-time Work 5311 17.174 11.083 0 47.400
Experience in Part-time Work 5311 3.225 5.742 0 38.000
Experience in Unemployment 5311 0.565 1.369 0 24.100
Tenure 5311 12.340 9.923 0 48.000
Job Satisfaction 5311 6.873 2.014 0 10
Monthly Gross Wage 5311 2690.630 1615.831 400.000 24315.000
Performance Pay 5311 0.191 0.393 0 1
Commuting Distance 5311 22.231 53.203 0 999
Firm Size
Firm Size I ( < 20 Employees) 5311 0.201 0.401 0 1
Firm Size II ( 20-200 Employees) 5311 0.304 0.460 0 1
Firm Size III ( 201-2000 Employees) 5311 0.249 0.432 0 1
Firm Size IV ( > 2000 Employees) 5311 0.246 0.431 0 1
Industry
Agriculture & Forestry 5311 0.008 0.092 0 1
Mining & Energy 5311 0.016 0.126 0 1
Manufacturing 5311 0.285 0.451 0 1
Construction 5311 0.043 0.203 0 1
Trade 5311 0.119 0.324 0 1
Transport & Communication 5311 0.055 0.228 0 1
Banking & Insurance 5311 0.051 0.220 0 1
Firm-Related Services 5311 0.082 0.275 0 1
Other Services 5311 0.258 0.438 0 1
Public Organizations 5311 0.083 0.275 0 1
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Instruments
WFH_2002 3769 0.109 0.312 0 1
Computer_2006 3769 0.035 0.185 0 1
Robustness Check
Paid Overtime Hours 3843 0.718 2.316 0 24.750
Unpaid Overtime Hours 3843 2.648 3.824 0 24.750
Source:  SOEP (waves 2002, 2006 and 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 18 
years of schooling correspond to a university degree. For the instruments we use information from the years 
2002 and 2006, respectively. For all other variables we use information from the year 2009. The variables 
paid overtime hours and unpaid overtime hours have more missing values and thus fewer observations. We 
calculate average weekly overtime hours.
 
 
WFH WIO
Mean Mean Diff. P-Value
Female 0.4066 0.5038 -0.0972 0.0000
Age 44.4219 43.7277 0.6942 0.0637
Partner 0.8844 0.8400 0.0444 0.0005
Children under 16 Years 0.3787 0.3203 0.0584 0.0018
Years of Schooling 14.6506 12.2214 2.4292 0.0000
Part-time Work 0.1690 0.2361 -0.0671 0.0000
Experience in Full-time Work 17.2165 17.1670 0.0495 0.9048
Experience in Part-time Work 2.6982 3.3161 -0.6179 0.0015
Tenure 11.9502 12.4079 -0.4577 0.2245
Leadership Position 0.6366 0.1492 0.4874 0.0000
Monthly Gross Wage 3942.7010 2472.8190 1469.8820 0.0000
Commuting Distance 33.1741 20.3271 12.8470 0.0000
Table 2.  Comparison of Working from Home (WFH) and Working in the Office (WIO)
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  In total we have 5311 observations, 787 for WFH and 4524 for WIO.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
WFH 4.1870*** 3.5044*** 2.4086*** 2.4287***
(0.2657) (0.2765) (0.2842) (0.2815)
Socio-Economic Background no yes no yes
Job Characteristics no no yes yes
Constant 3.2307*** 1.9524***  1.8405*** 4.4343***
(0.0735) (0.6199) (0.5404) (0.8399)
Observations 5311 5311 5311 5311
R-Squared 0.0723 0.1180 0.1866 0.2032
Table 3.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (OLS Estimation)
Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
Specification (1) does not include any control variables. Specifications (2) and (3) only include control 
variables for socio-economic background and job characteristics, respectively. In specification (4), we include 
all control variables for socio-economic background and job characteristics as listed in table 1.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
WFH 4.3366*** 4.9400***
(1.1309) (1.0581)
WFH_2002 0.3114*** 0.2942***
(0.0259) (0.0261)
Computer_2006 0.2285***
(0.0429)
Socio-Economic Background yes yes yes yes
Job Characteristics yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.1457** -0.1372** 4.8769*** 5.0044***
(0.0575) (0.0571) (1.0013) (0.9953)
Observations 3769 3769 3769 3769
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic 144.6965 93.4304
Hansen J Statistic
                 P-Value 0.2111
Centered R-Squared 0.2992 0.3116 0.2073 0.1981
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
In the IV estimation are fewer observations than in the OLS estimation as we only include employees who can 
be observed in all three years (2002, 2006 and 2009). In specification (1), we include WFH_2002 as instrument 
for WFH. In specification (2), we include two instruments for WFH; WFH_2002 and computer_2006. Both 
specifications include all control variables for socio-economic background and job characteristics as listed in 
table 1.
Table 4.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (IV Estimation (2SLS))
First Stage Second Stage
WFH Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (waves 2002, 2006 and 2009), own calculations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
WFH_Daily 7.1424*** 6.8408*** 5.6037*** 5.6845***
(0.9861) (0.9599) (0.9104) (0.9059)
WFH_Often 4.7723*** 4.2147*** 3.0702*** 3.1659***
(0.6129) (0.6086) (0.5964) (0.5894)
WFH_Sometimes 4.1745*** 3.3193*** 2.1187*** 2.1369***
(0.5317) (0.5310) (0.5192) (0.5121)
WFH_Rarely 3.1617*** 2.3970*** 1.3873*** 1.3584***
(0.3229) (0.3260) (0.3333) (0.3298)
Socio-Economic Background no yes no yes
Job Characteristics no no yes yes
Constant 3.2307*** 2.0766*** 1.9393*** 4.5598***
(0.0735) (0.6196) (0.5394) (0.8356)
Observations 5311 5311 5311 5311
R-Squared 0.0799 0.1276 0.1951 0.2122
Table 5.  Working from Home (WFH) Frequency and Work Effort (OLS Estimation)
Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
The reference category for the working from home frequency is WFH_Never. Specification (1) does not include 
any control variables. Specifications (2) and (3) only include control variables for socio-economic background 
and job characteristics, respectively. In specification (4), we include all control variables for socio-economic 
background and job characteristics as listed in table 1.
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(1) (2)
Performance Pay Fixed Wage
WFH 2.3907*** 2.5380***
(0.4823) (0.3438)
Socio-Economic Background yes yes
Job Characteristics yes yes
Constant 5.1211** 4.2129***
(2.0044) (0.9239)
Observations 1014 4297
R-Squared 0.2539 0.1981
Table 6.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (OLS Estimation) 
         Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average 
actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. In specification 
(1), we only include employees, who receive a performance pay. Employees, who 
receive a fixed wage, are included in specification (2). Both specifications 
include all control variables for socio-economic background and job 
characteristics as listed in table 1.
 
 
Paid
Overtime Hours
Unpaid
Overtime Hours
(1) (2)
WFH -0.1959* 1.3185***
(0.1006) (0.2168)
Socio-Economic Background yes yes
Job Characteristics yes yes
Constant 2.2901*** 2.2865***
(0.5449) (0.7203)
Observations 3843 3843
R-Squared 0.0726 0.1314
Table 7.  Working from Home (WFH) and Overtime Hours (OLS Estimation)
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. The variables paid overtime hours 
and unpaid overtime hours have more missing values and thus fewer observations. 
We calculate average weekly overtime hours. Specification (1) and (2) include all 
control variables for socio-economic background and job characteristics as listed 
in table 1.
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Appendix 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WFH 4.1870*** 3.5044*** 2.4086*** 2.4287***
(0.2657) (0.2765) (0.2842) (0.2815)
Socio-Economic Background
Female -1.6004*** -0.7130***
(0.1442) (0.1869)
Age -0.0151** -0.0374**
(0.0076) (0.0177)
Partner -0.1873 -0.3486*
(0.2083) (0.2030)
Foreign -0.7277*** -0.4567*
(0.2785) (0.2769)
Years of Schooling 0.2064*** -0.1050**
(0.0351) (0.0430)
Children under 16 Years -0.5996*** -0.5458***
(0.1587) (0.1594)
Caring Responsibilities 0.5131 0.4430
(0.8136) (0.6932)
Risk Tolerance 0.1099*** 0.0592*
(0.0367) (0.0351)
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work -0.5529*** -0.0482
(0.2126) (0.2269)
Fixed-term Work 0.5203* 0.4132
(0.3002) (0.2983)
Leadership Position 1.4069*** 1.5800***
(0.4762) (0.5099)
Experience in Full-time Work -0.0074 0.0108
(0.0089) (0.0180)
Experience in Part-time Work 0.0041 0.0446*
(0.0154) (0.0239)
Experience in Unemployment 0.0107 0.0143
(0.0480) (0.0498)
Tenure -0.0404*** -0.0406***
(0.0095) (0.0095)
Table A1.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (OLS Estimation)
Work Effort
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job Satisfaction -0.2098*** -0.2032***
(0.0375) (0.0373)
Monthly Gross Wage 0.0009*** 0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Performance Pay 0.0649 0.0359
(0.1982) (0.2000)
Commuting Distance 0.0056*** 0.0047**
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Constant 3.2307*** 1.9524***  1.8405*** 4.4343***
(0.0735) (0.6199) (0.5404) (0.8399)
Observations 5311 5311 5311 5311
R-Squared 0.0723 0.1180 0.1866 0.2032
Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
Furthermore, we include 16 regional dummies in specifications (2) and (4) as well as 9 dummies for 
occupational position, 4 firm size dummies and 10 industry dummies in specifications (3) and (4) as listed in 
table 1.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
WFH 4.3366*** 4.9400***
(1.1309) (1.0581)
WFH_2002 0.3114*** 0.2942***
(0.0259) (0.0261)
Computer_2006 0.2285***
(0.0429)
Socio-Economic Background
Female -0.0160 -0.0172 -0.6377*** -0.6272***
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.2227) (0.2242)
Age -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0452** -0.0450**
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0215) (0.0215)
Partner 0.0011 0.0011 -0.1898 -0.1891
(0.0140) (0.0139) (0.2448) (0.2455)
Foreign 0.0149 0.0128 -0.4199 -0.4281
(0.0182) (0.0186) (0.3324) (0.3337)
Years of Schooling 0.0103*** 0.0107*** -0.1637*** -0.1725***
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0539) (0.0534)
Children under 16 Years 0.0107 0.0085 -0.7573*** -0.7694***
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.1915) (0.1929)
Caring Responsibilities -0.0186 -0.0100 0.1134 0.1197
(0.0359) (0.0360) (0.7740) (0.7780)
Risk Tolerance 0.0027 0.0021 0.0301 0.0284
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0414) (0.0415)
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work 0.0165 0.0182 0.0032 -0.0068
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.2701) (0.2705)
Fixed-term Work -0.0100 -0.0080 0.7610* 0.7613*
(0.0263) (0.0256) (0.4449) (0.4483)
Leadership Position 0.2038*** 0.1934*** 1.2744** 1.1314*
(0.0300) (0.0295) (0.6500) (0.6432)
Experience in Full-time Work 0.0013 0.0010 0.0150 0.0141
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0214) (0.0215)
Experience in Part-time Work 0.0021 0.0017 0.0499* 0.0482*
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0282) (0.0282)
Table A2.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (IV Estimation (2SLS))
First Stage Second Stage
WFH Work Effort
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
Experience in Unemployment -0.0054* -0.0050* 0.0734 0.0780
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0697) (0.0699)
Tenure -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0384*** -0.0377***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Job Satisfaction 0.003 0.0025 -0.1994*** -0.2015***
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0436) (0.0437)
Monthly Gross Wage 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0010*** 0.0010***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Performance Pay 0.0512*** 0.0431*** -0.0030 -0.0370
(0.0150) (0.0148) (0.2415) (0.2428)
Commuting Distance 0.0002 0.0001 0.0061** 0.0059**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Constant -0.1457** -0.1372** 4.8769*** 5.0044***
(0.0575) (0.0571) (1.0013) (0.9953)
Observations 3769 3769 3769 3769
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic 144.6965 93.4304
Hansen J Statistic
                 P-Value 0.2111
Centered R-Squared 0.2992 0.3116 0.2073 0.1981
First Stage Second Stage
WFH Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (waves 2002, 2006 and 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
In the IV estimation are fewer observations than in the OLS estimation as we only include employees who can 
be observed in all three years (2002, 2006 and 2009). In specification (1), we include WFH_2002 as instrument 
for WFH. In specification (2), we include two instruments for WFH; WFH_2002 and computer_2006. 
Furthermore, we include 16 regional dummies, 9 dummies for occupational position, 4 firm size dummies and 
10 industry dummies in both specifications as listed in table 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
WFH_Daily 7.1424*** 6.8408*** 5.6037*** 5.6845***
(0.9861) (0.9599) (0.9104) (0.9059)
WFH_Often 4.7723*** 4.2147*** 3.0702*** 3.1659***
(0.6129) (0.6086) (0.5964) (0.5894)
WFH_Sometimes 4.1745*** 3.3193*** 2.1187*** 2.1369***
(0.5317) (0.5310) (0.5192) (0.5121)
WFH_Rarely 3.1617*** 2.3970*** 1.3873*** 1.3584***
(0.3229) (0.3260) (0.3333) (0.3298)
Socio-Economic Background
Female -1.6604*** -0.7422***
(0.1432) (0.1852)
Age -0.0171** -0.0353**
(0.0076) (0.0175)
Partner -0.1829 -0.3451*
(0.2068) (0.2016)
Foreign -0.7182*** -0.4483
(0.2776) (0.2746)
Years of Schooling 0.2040*** -0.1129***
(0.0349) (0.0424)
Children under 16 Years -0.6053*** -0.5485***
(0.1579) (0.1582)
Caring Responsibilities 0.3826 0.3164
(0.7952) (0.6904)
Risk Tolerance 0.1165*** 0.0641*
(0.0366) (0.0350)
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work -0.5958*** -0.0875
(0.2105) (0.2247)
Fixed-term Work 0.5120* 0.4001
(0.2990) (0.2971)
Leadership Position 1.3867*** 1.5941***
(0.4748) (0.5075)
Experience in Full-time Work -0.0089 0.0072
(0.0089) (0.0178)
Table A3.  Working from Home (WFH) Frequency and Work Effort (OLS Estimation)
Work Effort
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience in Part-time Work 0.0014 0.0401*
(0.0152) (0.0235)
Experience in Unemployment 0.0130 0.0156
(0.0483) (0.05)
Tenure -0.0414*** -0.0417***
(0.0094) (0.0094)
Job Satisfaction -0.2161*** -0.2101***
(0.0374) (0.0372)
Monthly Gross Wage 0.0009*** 0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Performance Pay 0.1048 0.0760
(0.1977) (0.1995)
Commuting Distance  0.0054*** 0.0045**
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Constant 3.2307*** 2.0766*** 1.9393*** 4.5598***
(0.0735) (0.6196) (0.5394) (0.8356)
Observations 5311 5311 5311 5311
R-Squared 0.0799 0.1276 0.1951 0.2122
Work Effort
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. 
The reference category for the working from home frequency is WFH_Never. Furthermore, we include 16 
regional dummies in specifications (2) and (4) as well as 9 dummies for occupational position, 4 firm size 
dummies and 10 industry dummies in specifications (3) and (4) as listed in table 1.
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(1) (2)
Performance Pay Fixed Wage
WFH 2.3907*** 2.5380***
(0.4823) (0.3438)
Socio-Economic Background
Female -0.1834 -0.8367***
(0.4283) (0.2113)
Age -0.1880*** -0.0135
(0.0506) (0.0189)
Partner -1.0089* -0.2069 
(0.5799) (0.2131)
Foreign -0.9704* -0.3547
(0.5472) (0.3164)
Years of Schooling -0.0146 -0.1224**
(0.0984) (0.0478)
Children under 16 Years -0.6572* -0.5217***
(0.3861) (0.1752)
Caring Responsibilities -2.0918** 0.9082
(0.9219) (0.7803)
Risk Tolerance 0.2194** 0.0286
(0.0918) (0.0384)
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work -0.8696 0.1350
(0.6163) (0.2505)
Fixed-term Work -0.3883 0.5238*
(0.7022) (0.3177)
Leadership Position  2.7654** 1.5581***
(1.1783) (0.5607)
Experience in Full-time Work 0.1329*** -0.0071
(0.0514) (0.0191)
Experience in Part-time Work   0.2129*** 0.0218
(0.0727) (0.0254)
Experience in Unemployment 0.3277 -0.0130
(0.2802) (0.0507)
Tenure -0.0415* -0.0418***
(0.0228) (0.0105)
Table A4.  Working from Home (WFH) and Work Effort (OLS Estimation) 
         Work Effort
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(1) (2)
Performance Pay Fixed Wage
Job Satisfaction -0.0470 -0.2368***
(0.0928) (0.0404)
Monthly Gross Wage 0.0009*** 0.0010***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Commuting Distance -0.0017 0.0066***
(0.0043) (0.0023)
Constant 5.1211** 4.2129***
(2.0044) (0.9239)
Observations 1014 4297
R-Squared 0.2539 0.1981
Work Effort
Source: SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Work effort is defined as average 
actual working hours minus contractual working hours per week. In specification 
(1), we only include employees, who receive a performance pay. Employees, who 
receive a fixed wage, are included in specification (2). Furthermore, we include 
16 regional dummies in specifications (2) and (4) as well as 9 dummies for 
occupational position, 4 firm size dummies and 10 industry dummies in 
specifications (3) and (4) as listed in table 1.
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Paid
Overtime Hours
Unpaid
Overtime Hours
(1) (2)
WFH -0.1959* 1.3185***
(0.1006) (0.2168)
Socio-Economic Background
Female -0.2137*** -0.0604
(0.0805) (0.1627)
Age -0.0031 -0.0276*
(0.0107) (0.0155)
Partner -0.0658 -0.0016 
(0.1049) (0.1597)
Foreign 0.0411 -0.2081
(0.2041) (0.2699)
Years of Schooling -0.0652*** -0.0204
(0.0236) (0.0367)
Children under 16 Years -0.0781 0.0468
(0.0897) (0.1370)
Caring Responsibilities 0.8056 -0.6622
(0.5434) (0.4251)
Risk Tolerance -0.0328* 0.0205
(0.0190) (0.0310)
Job Characteristics
Part-time Work 0.3464** -0.4311**
(0.1372) (0.1956)
Fixed-term Work -0.1276 0.3710
(0.1492) (0.2486)
Leadership Position -0.9259** 1.5559***
(0.3969) (0.4434)
Experience in Full-time Work -0.0104 0.0313**
(0.0103) (0.0160)
Experience in Part-time Work 0.0027 0.0421*
(0.0120) (0.0223)
Experience in Unemployment 0.0210 0.0320
(0.0335) (0.0383)
Tenure -0.0150*** -0.0217***
(0.0053) (0.0082)
Table A5.  Working from Home (WFH) and Overtime Hours (OLS Estimation)
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Paid
Overtime Hours
Unpaid
Overtime Hours
(1) (2)
Job Satisfaction -0.0092 -0.0869***
(0.0191) (0.0314)
Monthly Gross Wage 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Performance Pay -0.2679*** 0.0169
(0.0934) (0.1653)
Commuting Distance 0.0005 0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0013)
Constant 2.2901*** 2.2865***
(0.5449) (0.7203)
Observations 3843 3843
R-Squared 0.0726 0.1314
Source:  SOEP (wave 2009), own calculations.
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. The variables paid overtime hours 
and unpaid overtime hours have more missing values and thus fewer observations. 
We calculate average weekly overtime hours. Furthermore, we include 16 
regional dummies in specifications (2) and (4) as well as 9 dummies for 
occupational position, 4 firm size dummies and 10 industry dummies in 
specifications (3) and (4) as listed in table 1.
 
 
 
